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The winds of change blew swiftly. The accession of three countries into NATO in March of 1999 was an unprecedented Western welcome to the new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. That the blanket of NATO protection now falls over these three countries is amazing, considering that a little over ten years ago, they were members of NATO's nemesis, the Warsaw Pact.
The winds of change to bring these countries up to NATO standards from a political, economic, and military perspective have slackened. Years of Soviet control of the political, economic, and military systems left these countries unprepared to contribute significantly to NATO. Poland, a proud country that historically desires to be a contender on the world scene, has accepted the challenge of providing NATO with a strong air arm. In order to succeed, it began three critical tasks: reform its political system to embrace a balanced civil-military relationship, modernize its Air Force to contribute to NATO missions, and strengthen its economic system to sufficiently support Air Force modernization.
The following analysis of Poland's progress in implementing these reforms to cement NATO membership is grounded in three themes: the political progress of the civil-military structure as expressed in Poland's guiding documents such as the Constitution and National Security Strategy; the economic progress of Poland's defense budget and defense industry to support Air Force modernization; and finally, the military progress in modernizing its Air Force for NATO. This analysis does not offer specific solutions but instead provides a broad brushstroke of the complex political, economic, and military issues surrounding Poland's contribution to NATO and its Western allies. Its intent is to provide a general understanding of the long road Poland has traveled to transform itself from a Soviet satellite to a country determined to become a valued, all-around contributor to NATO. We owe such an understanding to our new partner in an important alliance that ensures peace and stability in give the Polish government a foundation upon which to build a coherent, affordable modernization program. However, the plan is now irrelevant and all but dead, a victim of an insufficient budget. Finally, Dale Herspring focuses on the sometimes contentious and sometimes floundering civil-military relationship, which at times drags the military into the middle of political power plays.
The scholarly literature does not cover all hurdles to a reformed Air Force. Authors have not analyzed how the lack of a planning, programming, and budgeting system affects Air Force reform and modernization. The Naval Postgraduate School has developed a planning, programming, and budgeting system specifically for the Polish military based on the U.S.
process. Other than ongoing work at the Naval Postgraduate School and Michta's high level review, there is no assessment of the absence of a requirements generation process and how that affects weapon systems prioritization given Poland's austere budget. Also, the literature has been silent on any linkage between Poland's push to minimize budget deficits to meet European Union standards and an inadequate military modernization budget. It is not clear if Poland's desire for EU acceptance will override its desire to be a viable NATO contributor. 
Notes

Poland's Politics, Economy, and Military in 1989
Poland was one of the first Warsaw Pact countries to emerge from Soviet rule under which it had been chafing since the end of World War II. The Poles were never faint of heart in voicing their discomfort with the situation. In 1956, worker riots in the western city of Poznan forced the Polish government to direct the Soviet-led Polish Army to restore order. Finally, the last blow to Soviet rule came in the early 1980's when a cohesive group of trade unions, Solidarity, led strikes in the country's industrial centers. In an attempt to restore order to disrupted functions, the government declared martial law in December 1981. The Polish Communist party revealed its bankruptcy and relinquished its power to the Polish military led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski when the military enforced martial law. 4 The Communist party was never able to regain its lost authority. The unprecedented -Round Table" Fishbed is a light fighter interceptor; however, the WLOP uses the Fishbed only for pilot training and will retire it in the near future. 28 In the air-to-ground mission, the WLOP flies the Su-22
fighter-bomber. All combat aircraft entered the WLOP inventory in the 1980s except the , which first appeared in the 1960s. In addition to combat fighters, the WLOP also flies jet and turbo-prop trainers and transports.
Even under an improved organizational structure combining air and air defense forces, the WLOP marginally meets its mission of homeland air defense. More importantly, obsolescence 
Underlying Documents
After Despite the radical changes within the political structure accommodating NATO partnership, Poland's Air Force has not changed much over the past ten years. Although Poland promised NATO it would modernize much of its Air and Air Defense Forces, the defense budget currently does not support such an ambitious program. Despite Poland's search for creative ways to obtain modern aircraft without breaking its meager budget, the end of the road is not in sight.
The Defense Budget: Room for Modernization?
In the face of overwhelming odds, the Polish economy has grown at a comfortable and impressive rate of approximately 5% a year since the economy transformed from a centrally controlled economy into a free market economy. 2 Poland has made great progress in growing a vibrant economy due in part to the shock therapy treatment also known as the Economic Trade Unions orchestrated defense industry worker strikes calling for increased government orders for Polish produced arms and denouncing the government's -lack of support for defense plants." 21 In addition, two-thirds of the defense plants were deeply in debt and owed more than $245 million. 22 Major aviation plant PZL-Mielec declared bankruptcy in 1998 and received $10 million in new capital from the Polish government to continue operations. 23 The Ministry of Defense leadership is acutely aware of the urgency to transform not just the aviation industry, but the entire defense industry, into a competitive sector of the Polish economy. In 1999, then Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz stressed restructuring and privatization as keys to a viable Polish defense industry. However, the initial pain of privatization has rendered the Minister's actions ineffective. Not impervious to political pressure, Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz personally visited a firearm plant in central Poland in 1999 to deliver the news of a contract award to the Łucznik steel firm versus a foreign company. 24 However, the steel maker has been struggling with financial difficulties for some time. This contract may merely prolong the government lifeline to an unhealthy company hanging on by a thread.
Fear of privatization is holding the aviation industry back from converting to a modern industry. Unlike many of the small to mid-sized companies, the Polish government and the international community helped transform to privately owned entities, the aviation industry remains in the shadow of the Communist era as a state-controlled entity. 25 The state provides a sustaining lifeline to the companies, exemplified by the $10 million government bailout of PZLMielec. Production orders generated by Poland's aircraft modernization program will unlikely generate enough business to keep all aviation plants alive. At the height of the Cold War, Poland's aviation industry approached an output of 1000 aircraft a year. 26 However, after the collapse of its Warsaw Pact trading partners and the ensuing decrease in defense spending of countries around the world, Poland's aviation industry could no longer compete successfully in the global aviation market.
In late 1999, the Polish government took its first step to privatize the aviation industry when it passed two laws, one supporting defense industry privatization and the other supporting offset requirements for foreign military equipment purchases. 27 The first law allows defense companies to write off privatization costs. In addition, it targets government profits from the sale of defense plants to fund research and development, promotion of Polish weapons systems to foreign markets, and its own procurement of modern Polish-made weapons systems. The law is not a fire sale, however. The government plans to maintain ownership of seven defense plants. 28 Despite existing legislation to ease Polish defense industry's privatization, neither the government nor the defense industry has made any substantial progress. The Sejm's Defense
Committee worries that up to 80% of defense workers stand to retire, retrain, or simply become unemployed as a result of the industry restructures. 29 However, once Polish government and defense industry deal with the initial pain, the future for the defense industry will be secure when the surviving plants are competitive and capable.
The second law, the Offset Act, directly generates contracts for the defense industry.
Enacted on 10 September 1999, this law requires foreign companies entering into military supplies and equipment contracts with Poland to also enter into contracts to provide offsets to the Polish defense industry, or other Polish industry, at least equal to the value of the original contract. 30 The Offset Act applies only to contracts worth more than EUR 5 million. 31 Probably because of the law's direct benefits to the defense industry and the relative ease of enforcement, Poland has already awarded its first offset contract in November of 2000.
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Air Force Modernization Plans
The lack of modernization funds and healthy defense industries require the Defense Ministry to develop a coherent plan to best use its limited assets. Shortly after political reform, Polish leaders adopted a string of reform packages to guide the structure and priorities for the military. Perry class guided missile frigates to the Polish Navy; the frigate is the first Navy vessel to be fully compatible with NATO. 46 The U.S. granted the Poles the ships according to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 47 In addition, Germany is offering to lease its Leopard tanks to the Polish Army. 48 Lastly, the Polish Navy is searching for a couple of -second-hand" submarines to replace its obsolete Foxtrot-class subs. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden are potential sources.
49
In its attempt to inexpensively procure more modern and maintainable fighter aircraft, the Leasing is an effective way to obtain a capability quickly with little cash up front. However, depending on the terms of the lease, leasing is usually more expensive over time than outright purchase. The Poles were not always contemplating leasing. The Polish government gave the legal affirmation to begin a full-scale modern multi-role aircraft procurement as early as 1995. Reportedly the F-16 lease offers the actual airframes at no cost; however, the refurbishment and pilot/maintenance training costs could reach as high as $250 million over five years. 55 Nonetheless, whichever contractor wins the selection process, should it eventually materialize, must meet the 100% offset requirements for the Polish arms industry as set forth in the Offset 
